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Surveys on knowledge of eyewitness issues typically indicate that legal professionals and
jurors alike can be insensitive to factors that are detrimental to eyewitness accuracy.
One aim of the current research was to assess the extent to which judges, an under-
represented sample in the extant literature, are aware of factors that may undermine
the accuracy and reliability of eyewitness evidence (Study 1). We also sought to assess
the knowledge of a jury-eligible sample of the general public (drawn from the same
population as the judges) and compared responses from a multiple choice survey with a
scenario-based, response-generation survey in order to investigate whether question-
naire format alters the accuracy of responses provided (Study 2). Overall, judges demon-
strated a reasonable level of knowledge regarding general eyewitness memory issues.
Further, the jury-eligible general public respondents completing amultiple choice format
survey produced more responses consistent with experts than did participants who were
required to generate their own responses. The results are discussed in terms of the future
training requirements for legal professionals and the ability of jurors to apply the knowl-
edge they have to the legal context. Copyright# 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Mistaken eyewitness testimony is considered by many to be responsible for 75% of 301
cases of wrongful imprisonment in the US (The Innocence Project, 2012; Wells, Memon,
& Penrod, 2006; Wise & Safer, 2004). In many of these cases, the judge and/or juries were
convinced by testimony from a witness which implicated the defendant but which was, in
fact, inaccurate (e.g. Wells et al., 2006). Research in psychology has been directed at
identifying the factors that may affect the accuracy and reliability of eyewitness memory.
However, the extent to which scientiﬁc ﬁndings align with the “common sense” of legal
professionals and jurors is less clear. Investigations to date of the knowledge transfer among
academics, potential jurors and legal professionals have presented a somewhat bleak
picture (e.g. Magnussen et al., 2008; Wise & Safer, 2004; Wise, Safer, & Maro, 2011).Knowledge Base of Legal Professionals Regarding Eyewitness
Testimony
In a survey of 160 US judges’ knowledge and beliefs about eyewitness testimony, Wise
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K. A. Houston et al.current research evidence. For instance, judges’ knowledge differed from research
evidence in relation to: the optimum methods for line-up presentation and administra-
tion; memory decline; how the presence of a weapon might affect memory for the
perpetrator; the effects of disguise on the ability to accurately describe and identify
the perpetrator; and the potential effects of post-event information on eyewitness
testimony (Wise & Safer, 2004). Further surveys outside the US suggest similar low
levels of knowledge regarding eyewitness memory issues by legal professionals.
Granhag, Strömwall, and Hartwig (2005) found that the responses of Swedish police,
lawyers and judges were in line with expert opinion on issues such as the possible effects
of weapon presence during a crime, but not on issues such as line-up construction and
administration. Furthermore, Granhag et al. (2005) found that the legal professionals
surveyed seldom agreed with each other on whether certain factors might affect the
reliability and accuracy of eyewitness testimony. They reported that the judges, in
particular, were more likely than police ofﬁcers or lawyers to respond “don’t know”
to questionnaire items. Indicative of this pattern of responding, Granhag et al. (2005)
also reported that the legal professionals who were surveyed felt they were not up-to-date
with research on the reliability of eyewitness testimony. In a further survey, Magnussen
et al. (2008) found comparable low levels of knowledge regarding eyewitness memory
among a Norwegian judicial sample.
Taken together, the ﬁndings from the Innocence Project and surveys such as Wise
and Safer (2004) and Magnussen et al. (2008) suggest that the knowledge base of legal
professionals on eyewitness testimony is inadequate. However, in spite of these
ﬁndings, the acceptance of expert testimony on the quality of witness evidence in court
is relatively uncommon. One argument is that an understanding of the potential weak-
nesses or inaccuracies of eyewitness testimony falls within the domain of common
sense of both legal professionals and jurors. The extant literature, on the other hand,
suggests that the workings and vulnerabilities of eyewitness memory fall largely outwith
the realms of “common sense”.
Knowledge Base of Jurors Regarding Eyewitness Testimony
Surveys of mock jurors’ knowledge of eyewitness issues are more numerous than those
of judges and legal professionals. However, the ﬁndings of mock-juror surveys are
similar to surveys of legal professionals, as respondents typically demonstrate an under-
standing of eyewitness testimony that is at odds with research ﬁndings (Benton et al.,
2006; Brigham &Wolfskeil, 1983; Deffenbacher & Loftus, 1982; McConkey & Roche,
1989; Noon & Hollin, 1987). Mock jurors tend to be insensitive to biased procedures
used by law enforcement, such as poorly constructed line-ups, misleading feedback or
biased instructions (Shaw, Garcia, & McClure, 1999). Potential jurors also ﬁnd it
difﬁcult to distinguish between accurate and inaccurate witnesses (e.g. Lindsay, Wells,
& O’Connor, 1989; Lindsay, Wells, & Rumpel, 1981).
Part of the underlying cause of poor juror understanding regarding eyewitness
memory issues may be a lack of knowledge regarding the ability and performance
parameters of memory more generally. For instance, Simons and Chabris (2012)
surveyed the general public regarding common memory myths, such as events being
recorded in the memory akin to a video tape and able to be reviewed and inspected
at a later date, and that once a memory has been formed for an event it will not change.
Simons and Chabris (2012) found that their respondents claimed these memory mythsCopyright# 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Behav. Sci. Law (2013)
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not appear to be related to knowledge of eyewitness issues (Noon & Hollin, 1987).
Desmarais and Read (2011) conducted a meta-analysis of 23 experiments that
documented the knowledge of the general public about factors that may affect the
reliability of eyewitness testimony. Desmarais and Read (2011) found that the re-
sponses of the general public matched the general consensus expert opinion in the ﬁeld
for two-thirds of questions. However, the meta-analysis also revealed inconsistencies in
the ways in which “expert agreement” is reached on a topic and the topics that are
generally assessed across studies (Desmarais & Read, 2011). Owing to variability across
studies in terms of the topics on which potential jurors were assessed and the differ-
ences in methods used to measure knowledge, it is difﬁcult to evaluate the precise
nature of potential juror understanding.
Current Research
Research has typically investigated either the knowledge of legal professionals or the
knowledge of a jury-eligible general public regarding eyewitness evidence. However,
no research to date has assessed the knowledge of judges and the knowledge of a
jury-eligible general public from the same population. Consequently, an accurate
representation of the level of knowledge regarding eyewitness issues present in a given
courtroom as a function of either common sense (jurors) or professional experience
(judges) is absent from the extant literature. The current series of studies assessed
the levels of knowledge regarding eyewitness testimony among judges and jurors from
the same population, that is, individuals whose home nation is Scotland, UK. Both
groups (judges and jurors) completed the same questionnaire.STUDY 1
The commonly asserted assumption by judges that eyewitnessmemory is amatter of com-
mon sense contradicts research ﬁndings demonstrating that potential jurors (Cutler &
Penrod, 1995; Cutler, Penrod, & Dexter, 1990; Kassin & Barndollar, 1992; Shaw et al.,
1999) and legal professionals (Granhag et al., 2005; Wise & Safer, 2004) are typically
rather limited in their understanding of factors affecting eyewitness accuracy. Therefore,
in an attempt to assess the knowledge base of judges and jurors within the same popula-
tion, our ﬁrst experiment assessed judges’ knowledge regarding eyewitness testimony.
Method
Participants
Ninety-nine judges took part in our survey.1 Judges were recruited to take part in the
research during a routine professional development seminar run by the Judicial Studies1 The judges were informed that the provision of all information was voluntary. All of the judges surveyed
declined to complete the demographic information sheet provided to them. Therefore, the demographic in-
formation presented here represents demographic information available from the Judiciary of Scotland
website: http://www.scotland-judiciary.org.uk
Copyright# 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Behav. Sci. Law (2013)
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they had at least 10 years’ experience as an advocate, solicitor or lawyer as well as
considerable court experience. Sheriffs deal with the majority of criminal court cases
in Scotland and must retire from the bench on the day of their 70th birthday (Sheriffs’
Association, 2012). Of the current 142 sheriffs in Scotland, 112 are male and 30 are
female (Sheriffs’ Association, 2012). The sample recruited for the current study repre-
sents 70% of all active sheriffs in the jurisdiction.
Survey Development and Administration
A pool of statements concerning eyewitness identiﬁcation issues, including statements
used by Kassin et al. (2001); Read and Desmarais (2009a) and Deffenbacher and
Loftus (1982), was generated. From this initial pool a multiple choice questionnaire
was developed. The eyewitnesses topics selected for inclusion were based on ratings
of reliability supplied in the Kassin et al. (2001) expert survey in response to the ques-
tion, “Do you think this phenomenon is reliable enough for psychologists to present in
courtroom testimony?” Topics with levels of agreement among experts below 90% with
respect to reliability and/or research basis were not included in the survey, with the
exception of a trained observers question. The trained observer item in Kassin et al.
(2001) only received 39% consensus amongst experts and a 75% agreement that there
was a research basis for the conclusion that trained observers are no better or worse
than untrained eyewitnesses. However, given that police ofﬁcers frequently deliver
eyewitness evidence in court, the perceived accuracy of police (and other trained ob-
servers) as eyewitnesses was included as an item, based upon Read and Desmarais
(2009a) and Kassin et al. (2001). The question was as follows: police ofﬁcers often
witness various crimes and have to report their memories of them. In your opinion,
police ofﬁcers: (a) make more accurate witnesses than the average person; (b) are as
accurate as the average person; (c) make less accurate witnesses than the average
person; or (d) I don’t know. Response option (b) was designated as consistent with
expert opinion in line with Kassin et al. (2001).
The multiple choice (MC) questionnaire adopted a choice response format such
that respondents were required to complete the statement by circling their preferred
response option. Response options were provided for each question and all included
an “I don’t know” option. Each set of response options also included a response
consistent with the current understanding of that particular phenomenon within the
literature as determined by expert agreement within the Kassin et al. (2001) survey
and evaluation by the authors. One such example [drawn from the Read and Desmarais
(2009a) survey] was: “Sometimes witnesses experience crimes under the inﬂuence of
alcohol. In your opinion, alcohol intoxication: (a) improves a witness’s ability to later
recall people/crimes; (b) has no inﬂuence on a witness’s ability to later recall people/
crimes; (c) reduces a witness’s ability to later recall people/crimes; or (d) I don’t know.
Initial piloting of the questionnaire resulted in the rewording of a number of state-
ments to improve respondents’ understanding of the issues. As in Read and Desmarais
(2009a), this typically required some rewording to make the statements more compre-
hensible to a non-academic audience (i.e. ensure the meaning of the question was clear
and did not contain unfamiliar jargon). Following piloting, the ﬁnal questionnaire
comprised 11 topic areas (see Table 1). For 10 of the topics selected, expert agreement
according to the Kassin et al. (2001) results indicated an overall mean agreed reliabilityCopyright# 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Behav. Sci. Law (2013)
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conclusion, with the exception of the trained observers item.
An introductory paragraph at the outset of the questionnaire informed respondents
that the aim of the study was to examine how they believed a typical witness would
behave in particular circumstances. Respondents were asked to indicate which response
they believed was most accurate. They were also instructed not to guess and to use the
“I don’t know” response if they could not identify the accurate response. Respondents
were instructed to read and complete each question carefully in the order presented
and in their own time.
The survey was administered during a training course. Judges were requested to
complete the survey individually without discussion and were allocated as much time
as necessary to complete it. Responses to the questionnaire were either consistent or
inconsistent with expert opinion, in line with the ﬁndings of Kassin et al. (2001). For
example, for the question on post-event information “When witnesses are asked to
report about a crime they saw, their report generally: (a) includes not only what they
actually saw but also information they learned after the crime; (b) includes only what
they actually saw; or (c) I don’t know, response (a) would be coded as consistent with
expert opinion, response (b) would be coded as inconsistent with expert opinion and
response (c) would be coded as a “don’t know” response. Therefore, a coding packet,
designating responses as either consistent or inconsistent with expert opinion as above,
was generated in line with the Kassin et al. (2001) ﬁndings. Thus, given that only one of
the MC responses per topic was consistent with expert opinion and therefore could be
objectively coded, responses were categorized by one independent coder.Results and Discussion
Initial analysis
Initial coding of the data resulted in three response options: consistent with expert
opinion, inconsistent with expert opinion, and I don’t know. In order to identify ques-
tions for which the distribution of responses did not differ from chance, we ran multipleTable 1. Percentage of judges’ responses that were consistent with expert opinion, inconsistent with exper
opinion or “don’t know” responses
Consistent Inconsistent Don’t know
Estimator variables
Exposure duration 42.7 53.1 4.2
Alcohol intoxication 96.9 1.0 2.1
Weapon focus 40.2 42.3 17.5
Cross-race bias 61.2 21.4 17.4
Accuracy conﬁdence 64.9 28.9 6.2
Unconscious transference 83.7 11.2 5.1
Trained observers 52.6 45.4 2.1
System variables
Post-event information 90.6 2.1 7.3
Wording of questions 83.7 16.3 0.0
Child suggestibility 77.3 13.4 9.3
Mugshot-induced bias 45.4 26.8 27.8
Totals 67.2 23.8 9.0
Copyright# 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Behav. Sci. Law (2013
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K. A. Houston et al.chi-squared analysis with all three response options included for each item. This
analysis showed that every distribution differed from chance, χ2(2)≥ 98.0, p< 0.001,
Cramer’s ø=1.00. Consistent with Read and Desmarais (2009a), we then removed
the “I don’t know” responses from our analysis and re-ran the chi-squared analyses.
Removal of all “I don’t know” responses did little to change the results, with all distri-
butions differing from chance. As can be seen from Table 1, the judges only selected
the “I don’t know” option on average 9% of the time.
Overall consistency with expert opinion
Judges provided responses that were consistent with expert opinion 67% of the time
(see Table 1). Although it is difﬁcult to compare this percentage with those reported
in other articles, due to differences in question topics/response options, this percentage
does appear to fall within the 19–94% agreement reported by Wise and Safer (2004).
This result is similar to that of Granhag et al. (2005) in that judges answered two-thirds
of the questions posed to them correctly. The lowest percentage of responses that were
consistent with expert opinion was 40%, which was in response to the question on
mugshot bias. However, mugshot bias also resulted in the largest don’t know response,
comprising 28% of responses.
Item-speciﬁc consistency with expert opinion
Of all the questions asked, judges displayed the highest level of consistency with expert
opinion in relation to the effects of alcohol intoxication on a witness at the time of the
crime (97% of responses consistent with expert opinion). Judges also demonstrated
knowledge that an eyewitness’s statement may contain post-event information, with
91% of responses to this question being consistent with expert opinion. This is not
surprising, given that these two factors are probably commonly experienced in the
courtroom. Judges were less well informed about the effects of exposure duration on
memory, weapon focus, and mugshot bias, with less than 50% of responses to these
questions consistent with expert opinion.
Within our sample, responses that were consistent with expert opinion ranged from
a low of 40% for weapon focus to a high of 97% for alcohol intoxication, showing large
variability. It is clear from Table 1 that while the research on certain variables that affect
eyewitness memory are being successfully communicated to the Scottish courts, more
work needs to be done on topics such as exposure duration, weapon focus, the use of
police ofﬁcers as witnesses, the cross-race effect, mugshot bias and the relationship
between conﬁdence in memory and the accuracy of testimony.
Judges beliefs regarding juror knowledge
A further aim of our questionnaire was to assess the beliefs of judges regarding the
abilities of the jury. According to the revised Jury Instruction Manual published by the
Judicial Studies Committee (2012), judges are required to provide directions to a jury
regarding the role of the jury, the role of the judge, the verdicts available to them and
the innocent until proven guilty code. The judge may also instruct the jury on the
evidence presented at hand, but it is entirely up to judges to determine how much and
how speciﬁc their instructions on the evidence are (Judicial Studies Committee, 2012).Copyright# 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Behav. Sci. Law (2013)
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Table 2. Percentage of agree, disagree and neither agree nor disagree responses to the statements regarding
the ability of jurors and the use of expert evidence
Statement Agree Neither Disagree
Experts required to provide guidance on the reliability of eyewitness testimony 28.3 14.1 56.6
Experts are not needed for matters of common sense 74.7 11.1 11.1
Eyewitness testimony can be evaluated by common sense alone 72.8 17.2 8.1
Jurors are able to tell accurate from inaccurate eyewitnesses 63.6 25.3 11.1
More training is required in the reliability of eyewitness testimony as evidence 58.6 19.2 21.2
Note. Some of these ﬁgures will not total 100% as some questions were left blank.
Expert testimony on eyewitness evidenceTherefore, if judges believe that jury members are able to distinguish between an accurate
and an inaccurate witness on their own and/or that weaknesses in the testimony of a
witness are a matter of common sense, they may not instruct the jury regarding factors
that affect the reliability of eyewitness memory.
As can be seen from Table 2, an overwhelming 73% of judges surveyed indicated
that the reliability of eyewitness testimony is a matter of common sense, with 75%
also responding that experts are not required to inform the court of matters of
“common sense”.
Consistency with previous research
Judges sampled for this research provided responses consistent with expert opinion
67% of the time, on average. However, across our questions, judges’ responses demon-
strated a large degree of variability in their consistency with expert opinion (ranging
from a low of 40% to a high of 97%). Our ﬁndings, therefore, are similar to those of
Wise and Safer (2004) and Granhag et al. (2005) in that there is a degree of variability
in the level of knowledge exhibited by the judges. Taken together, the ﬁndings from the
current survey add to the message of previous work suggesting that knowledge transfer
between judges and academics/researchers is incomplete, the result of which is that
judges appear able to maintain specialized knowledge in some, but not all, aspects of
eyewitness memory.
Furthermore, the majority of judges also believed that jurors would be able to tell the
difference between accurate and inaccurate witnesses on their own. This is at odds with
the ﬁndings of Wise and Safer (2004), who found that only 46% of US judges responded
that they were conﬁdent in the abilities of their jury-eligible citizens to recognize factors
that affect identiﬁcation accuracy. Thus, Scottish judges appear more conﬁdent in the
ability of jury-eligible citizens in Scotland to discriminate between reliable and unreliable
eyewitnesses than judges surveyed in the US. We wondered to what extent this
conﬁdence was justiﬁed and conducted Study 2 to assess the “common sense” beliefs
of a jury-eligible general public derived from the same nation as the judges.STUDY 2
Convictions that originally relied heavily on eyewitness testimony but are now known
to have been in error illustrate quite clearly that jurors and legal professionals alike
are often unable either to generate or to apply the common sense expected of themCopyright# 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Behav. Sci. Law (2013)
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ipants were aware of factors such as length of exposure to the perpetrator, age of witness
and delay between encountering the crime and making an identiﬁcation, they were
unaware of how the different test procedures and interview tactics of the police can
inﬂuence the accuracy of eyewitness testimony.
However, having knowledge of the right response and applying that knowledge
appropriately could be conceptualized as rather different tasks. A closer examination
of the literature reveals that some methodologies assess the ability of participants to
recognize the correct response whilst others assess the ability of participants to apply
that knowledge appropriately (for a review, see Read & Desmarais, 2009b). Read and
Desmarais (2009b) suggested that the use of different methods may give an inaccurate
representation of the level of juror understanding regarding eyewitness testimony evi-
dence. For instance, some surveys have used MC format questions to evaluate juror
knowledge (e.g. Deffenbacher & Loftus, 1982; Noon & Hollin, 1987), effectively
relying upon the participants to recognize the correct answer. Others have used a more
evaluative response format of Likert-type scales with agree–disagree anchors (Kassin &
Barndollar, 1992). An evaluative format has also been used in one of the more recent
investigations of juror knowledge in the US, which used the Kassin et al. (2001) survey
items with limited modiﬁcations (Benton et al., 2006).
Previous research has shown that self-constructed response formats (where the
respondent generates the response unaided) measure higher-order reasoning abilities
while MC taps lower-level cognitive processes (such as familiarity or recognition
responses) or factual knowledge (Katz, Bennet, & Berger, 2000). Furthermore, MC
items can provide unintended hints and these hints may be a potential source of
construct-irrelevant variance (Messick, 1989). It is, of course, also the case that ques-
tions that require evaluation or inference may promote responses or articulate thinking
in ways that would not otherwise occur spontaneously (Chan & Kennedy, 2002).
In the light of these ﬁndings, it might be asked whether MC-type surveys of juror
knowledge simply overestimate what jurors actually know about eyewitness issues.
However, to date, there are no empirical data on this topic (Read & Desmarais,
2009b). Therefore, in order to address this question, the current experiment evaluated
mock juror understanding of factors inﬂuencing the reliability of eyewitness testimony
with both MC and response generation (RG) questionnaires. Our aim was to determine
whether jurors could spontaneously generate “common sense” responses in relation to
various eyewitness issues – as opposed to relying on potential cues inherent in some
(but not all) MC alternatives. To achieve this, we adopted a methodological strategy
employed by Chan and Kennedy (2002), who matched MC and RG questions with
identical stems such that our potential jurors were required to answer equivalent ques-
tions but in different formats. In the MC version, respondents were required to choose
their answer from either three or four response alternatives (identical to Study 1), while
in the RG condition they were required to produce the answer on their own.
Methods
Participants
A total of 192 potential jurors (81 males and 115 females) completed the survey in
Scotland with 96 participants completing the MC questionnaire, and 96 participantsCopyright# 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Behav. Sci. Law (2013)
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within the UK (the others being England, Wales, and Northern Ireland) and whilst
not an independent country, Scotland has its own legal system and Parliament (The
National Archives, 2003). Within this jurisdiction, jurors must be between 18 and
65 years of age, be cited on the electoral register and have lived in the UK for a
period of at least 5 years since the age of 13 years. In the current study, respondents
ranged in age from 18 to 65 years (M=37.70; SD=15.24). Almost all respondents
(98%) had obtained some level of educational qualiﬁcation. Most had completed
secondary education (61%), while a further 38% indicated that they had completed
undergraduate university-level education. Only 10% of the sample reported previous
experience of jury service. All respondents spoke English as their ﬁrst or main language
and were UK residents. It should be noted that jurors in Scotland and the rest of the
UK are randomly selected and there is no voir dire process.Survey development and administration
The same MC questionnaire used in Study 1 was also employed in this study. All
question topics were the same for both the RG and the MC questionnaires. The stems
used for the MC questionnaire were turned into scenarios for the purposes of the RG
questionnaire. Thus, for the RG questionnaire, respondents were ﬁrst of all required
to indicate a categorical response to the statement (yes, no, I don’t know) and were
then asked to explain their answer in free text. For example, “People sometimes witness
crimes under the inﬂuence of alcohol. If a witness were intoxicated at the time of the
crime, would this affect their ability to remember what they saw? Respondents then
ticked either a yes/no/I don’t know response before moving to the second part of the
question: “If yes, what exactly do you think the effect might be and why? If no, why
do you think this is the case?”
Researchers managed a volunteer desk at a shopping mall in a busy city centre in
Scotland, UK, for a period of 14 days. Respondents were invited to participate on a
voluntary basis. Respondents were randomly assigned to complete either the RG or
MC version of the questionnaire. The questionnaires were completed individually
and respondents took between 20 and 30 min, with the RG questionnaire taking longer
on average to complete. On completion, respondents were debriefed and thanked for
their contribution.
As in Study 1, responses to the MC questionnaire were coded as either consis-
tent or inconsistent with expert opinion using the coding packet based upon Kassin
et al. (2001). Responses for the RG questionnaire were independently coded by the
second and third authors as either consistent or inconsistent with expert opinion as
identiﬁed by the Kassin et al. (2001) survey. Responses that were illegible or in
other ways unable to be coded (such as completely off-topic or irrelevant
responses) were eliminated as “not codable”. Inter-coder correlations indicated a
mean agreement of r=0.72. Where there was divergence of opinion between
coders, the response was re-analyzed and discussed by both coders until an agreed
code was reached. The re-coded responses from both questionnaires were then
combined to form a ﬁnal dataset comprising the following response categories:
“consistent with expert opinion”, “inconsistent with expert opinion” and “I don’t
know” responses.Copyright# 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Behav. Sci. Law (2013)
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type.
Multiple choice Response generation
C I DK C I DK
Estimator variables
Exposure duration 67.7 30.2 2.1 68.8 17.7 13.5
Alcohol intoxication* 91.7 3.1 5.2 62.5 30.2 7.3
Weapon focus* 49.0 42.7 8.3 26.0 57.3 16.7
Cross-race bias 60.4 30.2 9.4 35.4 33.3 31.3
Accuracy conﬁdence 31.3 63.5 4.2 21.9 43.8 18.8
Unconscious transference* 76.0 19.8 4.2 36.5 38.5 25.0
Trained observers* 37.5 48.3 4.2 11.5 76.0 12.5
System variables
Post-event information 62.5 26.0 11.5 72.9 15.6 11.5
Wording of questions* 66.7 29.2 4.2 75.0 9.4 15.6
Child suggestibility 63.5 24.0 12.5 59.4 25.0 15.6
Mugshot-induced bias 64.6 18.8 16.7 58.3 18.8 22.9
Totals 61.1 31.4 7.5 48.0 33.2 18.7
*p≤ 0.004.
K. A. Houston et al.Results and Discussion
The aim of the current study was to assess juror knowledge of eyewitness issues elicited
by two different questionnaire formats whereby respondents completed either an MC
format survey or an RG survey (wherein they were required to generate their own
responses). Responses in both surveys were coded as either consistent or inconsistent
with documented expert opinion (from Kassin et al., 2001). Overall results are
presented in Table 3 (including the “I don’t know” responses).Overall consistency with expert opinion
Participants scored an average of 61% consistency with expert opinion on the MC
questionnaire. However, only 48% of participants’ responses on the RG questionnaire
were consistent with expert opinion (see Table 3). In comparison to the previous litera-
ture, both these consistency scores are below the overall two-thirds agreement reported
by Desmarais and Read (2011) in their recent meta-analysis.Item-speciﬁc consistency with expert opinion across questionnaire formats
Consistent with Read and Desmarais (2009a), responses to the MC and RG question-
naire formats were analyzed with and without the “I don’t know” responses. Inclusion
of the “I don’t know” responses resulted in signiﬁcant differences in the consistency of
responses with expert opinion between the MC and RG questionnaires on eight topics.
However, removal of the “I don’t know” response option reduced the number of
signiﬁcant differences to ﬁve topics.2 Therefore, the more conservative analysis with2 Topics of alcohol intoxication, weapon focus, trained observers, wording of questions, and unconscious
transference.
Copyright# 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Behav. Sci. Law (2013)
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comparisons (11), a critical value of α=0.004 was employed.
As can be seen from Table 3, averaged across questionnaire formats and question
topics, our community sample provided responses consistent with the expert opinions
expressed in Kassin et al. (2001) 55% of the time. However, consistency of response
with expert opinion appeared to be associated with questionnaire format for the topics
of alcohol intoxication, weapon focus, unconscious transference, trained observers,
and wording of questions [χ2(1)≥ 8.0, p< 0.004, Cramer’s ø≥ 0.20] (full statistics for
each comparison can be found in Table 4).
On the topic of alcohol intoxication, 92% of responses were consistent with expert
opinion in the MC questionnaire and this dropped to 62% when the same question
was asked in an RG format. For weapon focus, 49% of MC responses were consistent
with expert opinion, compared with 26% of RG responses. The pattern evident for
trained observers was similar: there was a higher percentage of responses consistent
with expert opinion for the MC questionnaire (37%) than for the RG questionnaire
(11%), as was the case for unconscious transference, with 76% of MC responses
consistent with expert opinion, compared with 36% of RG responses. However, for
the wording of questions topic, the pattern was reversed, with a higher percentage of
responses to the RG questionnaire being consistent with expert opinion (75%) than
was the case for the MC questionnaire (67%).
Consistency with previous research
Read and Desmarais (2009a) report a 67% consistency rate between a Canadian com-
munity sample and items of the Kassin et al. (2001) survey on which experts had
reached consensus. The current survey reported a 61% consistency rate with experts.
However, this relatively high rate of consistency with expert opinion was only found
when participants completed the MC and not the RG version of the survey. For all
estimator factors, juror knowledge appeared to be reasonably high across a number of
topics when multiple-response alternatives were provided and respondents were simply
required to choose what they believed to be the correct response. Yet when participantsTable 4. Comparison of consistent (C) responses by questionnaire type
MC RG χ2 p ø
Estimator variables
Exposure duration 67.7 68.8 2.464 .116 .12
Alcohol intoxication* 91.7 62.5 26.403 <.001 .38
Weapon focus* 49.0 26.0 8.402 .004 .22
Cross-race bias 60.4 35.4 3.594 .058 .15
Accuracy conﬁdence 31.3 21.9 0.691 .708 .07
Unconscious transference* 76.0 36.5 16.969 <.001 .32
Trained observers* 37.5 11.5 15.206 <.001 .29
System variables
Post-event information 62.5 72.9 3.269 .071 .14
Wording of questions* 66.7 75.0 9.567 .002 .23
Child suggestibility 63.5 59.4 0.102 .749 .02
Mugshot-induced bias 64.6 58.3 0.071 .789 .02
MC, multiple choice; RG, response generation.
*p≤ 0.004.
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icantly poorer for over half of the topics.
Although these ﬁndings produced rates of agreement with expert opinion that are
lower than those established in the previous literature, the discrepancy between MC
and RG questionnaire formats was as predicted. Chan and Kennedy (2002) suggested
that respondents produce less accurate responses on RG-type questions than on
equivalent MC questions because closed questions (such as MC) restrict the frame of
reference, focus attention on the available alternatives and allow a deliberate choice,
decision or process of deduction (Schuman & Scott, 1987). Bearing this in mind, it
is possible that MC surveys overestimate the ability of potential jurors to correctly
identify potential threats to eyewitness accuracy when quizzed about their knowledge
in an MC format survey. The results of the current study certainly support such an
argument. These ﬁndings are also consistent with those reported by Alonzo and Lane
(2010), who examined the relationship between expressed beliefs regarding eyewitness
factors and the ability to use this knowledge when evaluating a witness. Alonzo and
Lane (2010) found that survey responses did not predict subsequent evaluations of
eyewitness evidence. Therefore, our conclusion is also consistent with previous
arguments that the use of questionnaires might overestimate the extent to which
potential jurors will apply their knowledge of the vulnerabilities of eyewitness testimony
(e.g. Alonzo & Lane, 2010; Cutler, Penrod, & Stuve, 1988; Read & Desmarais, 2009b;
Laub & Bornstein, 2008).GENERAL DISCUSSION
The ﬁndings of the current studies reveal that judges and members of the public in the
sample jurisdiction shared comparable rates of knowledge regarding factors that could
affect the reliability of eyewitness testimony. However, judges appear to overestimate
the ability of jurors to distinguish between accurate and inaccurate eyewitnesses and
thus overestimate jurors’ common sense. In contrast to our ﬁndings, Wise and Safer
(2004) found that judges who were more knowledgeable about eyewitness testimony
were more likely to believe that jurors may have only limited knowledge about factors
likely to affect eyewitness accuracy. Consequently, Wise and Safer (2004) strongly
recommended the education of judges as a means to reduce the impact of mistaken
eyewitness testimony. Encouragingly, 58% of the judges surveyed in Study 1 believed
that they required additional training in the area of eyewitness testimony and its
reliability as evidence in court. Study 2 identiﬁed a number of topics where juror
knowledge might be less consistent with expert opinion than previously documented,
and this could possibly be due to the response formats used in earlier surveys. However,
data from the current survey and sample suggest that there are topics where potential
jurors were able to generate a response consistent with that generally agreed upon by
experts.
There are, of course, a number of important caveats associated with the current
ﬁndings. The very nature of the research questions means that there was a fundamental
difference in the tasks faced by respondents depending upon which questionnaire they
were required to complete. On average, the RG questionnaire took longer to complete
and exerted greater task demands on respondents than the MC questionnaire, in that
they were required to generate a response (as opposed to selecting a response fromCopyright# 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Behav. Sci. Law (2013)
DOI: 10.1002/bsl
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and within the MC and RG questionnaire conditions in both studies interpreted the
questions in different ways and tailored their responses accordingly, despite our pilot
testing to ensure question clarity.
It could also be argued that the participants in the RG condition were at a greater
disadvantage than those in the MC condition, as no additional information was
available to them to contextualize their responses. Indeed, this criticism could be
leveled at surveys of this type in general. Completing a questionnaire is very different
from being fully immersed in a court setting in the role of a juror, where rich and
detailed contextual (and other case-relevant) material will be readily available.
However, it is important to note that bothCutler et al. (1988) andCutler et al. (1990) also
found signiﬁcant shortcomings in juror knowledge regarding eyewitness issues using a
mock juror court-based paradigm. Therefore, it might be argued that enhancing the
context does not necessarily stimulate the spontaneous generation of knowledge regard-
ing eyewitness topics.
Secondly, although we developed the current questionnaire using a selection of
items from several published sources, including the much-cited Kassin et al. (2001)
survey, it is possible that some survey items were problematic in their construction.
For instance, Wright (2006), in an examination of the Kassin et al. (2001) survey items,
suggests that many of the survey items were presented as associative hypotheses but
have the potential to be interpreted as causal. This could be problematic because an
alternative interpretation would have resulted in a different response and this could,
in particular, have affected our sample of judges. For example, a causal hypothesis
about the effect of emotion on memory might state that a highly emotional event will
negatively affect eyewitness accuracy and completeness. An expert might qualify this
statement by saying it is based on the sample of events included in the Deffenbacher
et al. (2004) meta-analysis concerning the effects of high stress on eyewitness memory.
However, if an expert is asked whether emotional events are remembered more accu-
rately than non-emotional events, the answer would involve comparing emotional
and non-emotional events. The latter involves testing an associative hypothesis. Wright
(2006) urged caution with respect to the general acceptance of questionnaire responses,
given that it is not certain that respondents interpreted the survey statements consistently.
Clearly, the same caution applies to the current studies.
In addition, the more general point made by Read and Desmarais (2009a, 2009b),
that presentation of the Kassin et al. (2001) items (which were designed to be answered
by experts) to laypersons may similarly introduce difﬁculties in interpretation, needs to
be kept in mind when direct comparisons are made between experts and jurors on
identical items. The items herein were modiﬁed to ameliorate this issue, but we may
not have been entirely successful in doing so. Nonetheless, the eyewitness topics
targeted in the current survey were those that exhibited the highest rates of expert
agreement in the original survey.CONCLUSIONS
Overall, the ﬁndings of the current set of studies suggest that there is a place within the
legal system for researchers to present scientiﬁc ﬁndings to inform the court: ﬁrst, to
assist in the training of judges and other legal professionals in factors potentiallyCopyright# 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Behav. Sci. Law (2013)
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ondly, to present relevant research to a jury in a courtroom. Our ﬁndings also suggest that
caution should be taken, particularly with respect to methodology, when evaluating the
level of knowledge relating to eyewitness topics. In particular, the results suggest that
the response format in previous surveys may have overestimated the understanding or
knowledge of the vulnerabilities of eyewitness testimony in relation to certain topics. How-
ever, the current results also demonstrate that potential jurors can, for some topics, be
relied upon to self-generate (rather than recognize) a response consistent with that gener-
ally agreed among experts. Previous research suggests that there may be a relationship
between jurors’ knowledge of eyewitnessmemory evidence vulnerabilities and the verdicts
they render in court (e.g. Neal, Christianson, Bornstein &Robicheaux, 2012). Therefore,
an avenue of future research could be to investigate whether responses to MC or RG
questionnaires differentially inﬂuence the verdicts delivered by judges and/or jurors.
An interesting question raised by these ﬁndings is whether simplistic MC-style ques-
tionnaires are the best method for assessing expert knowledge against which judge and
juror knowledge is compared. An important next step could be to present experts with a
questionnaire where they self-generate (rather than recognize) the response; it may very
well be that self-generated responses of experts could differ from the established Kassin
et al. (2001) MC survey. Future research should also focus more closely on the ability
of both judges and jurors to spontaneously apply a “common sense” understanding of
eyewitness issues encountered in court.REFERENCES
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